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Abstract 
Through the relevant case law and legislation, this paper explores the context of planning law 
in South Africa as it relates to the implementation of state infrastructure. With the adoption of 
the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA) in 2015, the 
planning of state infrastructure needed to comply with the provisions contained therein. It 
necessarily follows that those organs of state responsible for this planning need to rethink their 
processes and procedures relating to planning. The overlapping of constitutional planning 
competencies between the spheres of government has made planning for the implementation 
of state infrastructure increasingly complex and difficult. As a result, while there are a number 
of provisions in SPLUMA that obliquely relate to planning for the implementation of state 
infrastructure, there are numerous practical and legal difficulties associated with each one. It is 
revealed that the most legally and practically appropriate approach is an agreement in terms of 
Section 29 of SPLUMA. Using the South African National Roads Agency SOC Ltd 
(SANRAL) as an example of an organ of state who undertakes this type of planning, one is 
able to illustrate clearer the practical consequences in this regard. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The definition of planning law in South Africa is somewhat vague but basically encapsulates 
‘the area of law that provides for the creation of a sustainable land management planning 
framework as well as for the management of land development with the purpose of ensuring 
the health, safety and welfare of society as a whole’.1 South African planning law has 
undergone some drastic and fundamental changes in the past two decades. These changes have 
been precipitated through numerous planning statutes which determine the way in which 
planning in South Africa is regulated. The changes in planning legislation are coupled with a 
growing precedent of judicial decisions clarifying, restricting and expanding the roles of the 
various spheres of government in relation to the planning powers conferred on them through 
the Constitution2 and planning legislation.   
The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act3 (SPLUMA) was adopted in July of 2015 
in partial response to the declaration by the Constitutional Court in the case of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others4 of the partial 
invalidity of SPLUMA’s predecessor, the Development Facilitation Act5 (DFA). In this case, 
the court held that the Constitution confers certain planning competencies on all spheres of 
government by allocating ‘regional planning and development’ concurrently to the national 
and provincial spheres; ‘provincial planning’ exclusively to the provincial sphere; and 
‘municipal planning’ exclusively to the local sphere.6 The court held further that these 
functional areas, while not contained in hermetically sealed compartments, remain distinct 
from one another.7 SPLUMA thus became the framework planning legislation and the answer 
to the constitutional conundrum on the various planning competencies and functions often 
overlapping the spheres of government: national, provincial and municipal.  
SPLUMA encapsulated the growing precedent reinforcing municipalities’ autonomy in local 
planning matters to the extent that all development applications need now be submitted to a 
municipality as the authority of first instance.8 This has inevitably led to a situation in which 
                                                          
1 J van Wyk “The law on planning and the environment”, in ND King, HA Strydom & FP Retief (eds), Fuggle and 
Rabie’s Environmental Management in South Africa, 3 ed,, Juta, (2018), chapter 22 1135. 
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
3 Act 16 of 2013. 
4 2010 (6) SA 182 (CC). 
5 Act 67 of 1995. 
6 J van Wyk “The law on planning and the environment”, in ND King et al,(eds)  Fuggle and Rabie’s 
Environmental Management in South Africa, 1141. 
7 Paras 54 to 55. 
8 SPLUMA section 33(1). 
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organs of state and provincial departments responsible for implementing and developing 
infrastructure in the national and provincial interest (hereinafter referred to as state 
infrastructure) are left to the behest of a local or district municipality in whose jurisdiction the 
state infrastructure will be located. A situation is arising which may lead to the grinding halt of 
state infrastructure. Organs of state may attempt to steamroll municipalities. Municipalities 
may refuse to relinquish even the slightest planning control and essentially attempt to veto state 
infrastructure projects consequently. The state infrastructure development may well be in the 
provincial or national interests, but a municipality may not deem it desirable for one reason or 
another.  
Such an approach is, however, at odds with the legislative measures providing for the co-
operation of the spheres of government and an integrated decision-making process which 
should take place where a planning decision falls into the category of regional and/or provincial 
planning as well as municipal planning encapsulated in, among others, SPLUMA and the 
Constitution. This also relates to situations where legislation may enable an authority to give 
authorisations which are not out and out planning authorisations but which will have planning 
consequences. An example of this would be a decision by South African National Roads 
Agency Ltd (SANRAL)/Transnet/Eskom in terms of their enabling legislation to proceed with 
the implementation of state infrastructure. This paper will focus on the example of SANRAL 
and specific reference will be made to SANRAL’s enabling legislation, the South African 
National Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act,9 throughout. 
This paper will explore and unpack the legislative provisions which dictate the manner in which 
spheres of government are required to engage each other in order to expedite a decision for the 
implementation of state infrastructure. After contextualising this approach in the legislation, 
specific attention and amplification will be given to section 29 of SPLUMA which provides 
for a written agreement between a municipality and another sphere of government responsible 
for planning in terms of other enabling legislation. Such an agreement allows for the parties to 
reach consensus on a planning process for development authorisations and which process can 
be agreed on outside of the restrictions of a municipality’s bylaws. A section 29 agreement is 
therefore not constrained by the often onerous and prescriptive processes in a municipality’s 
planning bylaws which, if applied rigidly to state organs, would result in a scenario whereby 
an entity acting in the national or provincial interest would be relegated to the status of an 
                                                          
9 Act 7 of 1998. 
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ordinary developer in a municipality’s eyes. Such a scenario would frustrate service delivery 
and have serious consequences for ordinary citizens who would be deprived of having such 
infrastructure development being implemented and constructed without delay.  
This paper will also provide comment on the practical application of a section 29 agreement 
and how administrative action could be taken against municipalities if the agreement is not 
framed appropriately. Using SANRAL as an example of an organ of state responsible for the 
implementation of state infrastructure which has planning consequences through its enabling 
legislation, the arguments motivating the necessity of a section 29 agreement can be explored 
and illustrated in line with practical realities. 
The question which needs to be answered is, how does one expedite the implementation of 
state infrastructure (often administered by the provincial and national spheres) while at the 
same time respecting and adhering to the exclusive constitutional mandate of municipalities 
with regard to ‘municipal planning’?  
SPLUMA seemingly provides a number of possible avenues that an organ of state can utilise 
in order to answer this question. These avenues include:  
1. reliance on the integrity and ‘trickle down’ effect of the spheres’ respective Spatial 
Development Frameworks (SDFs);10 
2. pursuing an exemption from the provisions of SPLUMA for certain pieces of land or 
an area earmarked for the implementation of state infrastructure;11 
3. utilisation of the provisions of section 52 of SPLUMA which provides for development 
applications affecting the national Interest;12 
4. consultation and agreement between a municipality and organs of state responsible for 
land development. This would obviously include organs of state responsible for 
developing land for state infrastructure.13 
It will be shown that while avenues one through three may seem to be better fitted to deal with 
the question, this is practically not the case. It will be argued that the answer to the question, 
practically and legally, lies in section 29 of SPLUMA and the entering into of a written 
agreement between an organ of state and a municipality.  
                                                          
10 SPLUMA Chapter 4. This is discussed in detail at page 17. 
11 Section 55. This is discussed in detail at page 25. 
12 This is discussed in detail at page 26. 
13 Section 29. Discussed in detail at page 28. 
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Chapter 2: Planning roles and functions of the spheres of government 
The Constitution 
In order to understand why section 29 of SPLUMA is the most appropriate provision to deal 
with state infrastructure, it is helpful first to have a complete understanding of the different 
constitutional planning roles of the spheres of government and look at examples of where an 
organ of state has been given specific planning authority in terms of its enabling legislation.  
One needs also to understand the legislative obligations imposed on the spheres of government 
to ensure co-operation with each other and to avoid conflict where there may be an apparent 
overlap in competencies. In a planning context generally, it is important to bear in mind that 
‘planning entails land use and is inextricably connected to every functional area that concerns 
the use of land. There is probably not a single functional area in the Constitution that can be 
carried out without land’.14 This statement emphasises the degree and scope of the overlap. It 
brings into stark reality the significant and virtually impossible task of balancing the 
governmental spheres’ constitutional competencies with their respective constitutional 
functions.  
The Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa, which is significant as it follows that any 
law or conduct in conflict with the Constitution is invalid.15 The Constitution moved South 
Africa away from the previously adopted hierarchical ‘tiers’ of government, being the national, 
provincial and then municipal in descending order, to a government comprised of three 
‘spheres’. This shift from tiers to spheres ensures that no sphere can impose its will on another 
unless the Constitution allows for it or where constitutional processes and procedures have 
been followed. This enables the autonomy of each sphere to exercise its powers and functions 
within its own area.16  Furthermore, no sphere of government may assume any power or 
function except those conferred on it in terms of the Constitution and it should exercise its 
powers and perform its functions in a manner that does not encroach on the geographical, 
functional or institutional integrity of government in another sphere.17 The spheres are ‘distinct 
from one another and yet inter-dependent and inter-related’.18 
                                                          
14 Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo 2009 (1) SA 337 (CC) para 128. 
15 J Van Wyk, Planning Law, 2nd Edition, Juta, (2012), 75.  
16 Ibid 143. 
17 Ibid 143. 
18 Gauteng Development Tribunal, para 43. 
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In terms of section 44(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution, the national sphere has the power to pass 
legislation on a matter included in Schedule 4. The national sphere is excluded from passing 
any legislation within a functional area listed in Schedule 5 unless specific factors are apparent 
(these are provided for in section 44(2)). In terms of spatial planning, ‘regional planning and 
development’, ‘urban and rural development’, and ‘municipal planning’ are listed in schedule 
4 thus indicating that the national sphere is imbued with the power and function to legislate on 
these matters. SPLUMA is an example of the national sphere legislating on these matters, 
including ‘municipal planning’. The aforementioned competencies are concurrent with the 
provinces’ powers also to legislate on these matters. Section 104(1)(b)(ii) gives provinces the 
exclusive power and function to legislate on ‘provincial planning’19. Section 156(1)(a) of the 
Constitution gives municipalities executive power and the right to administer ‘municipal 
planning’20. Section 156(2) gives municipalities a further right to make and administer bylaws 
in pursuance of their executive powers and rights of administration. An important point which 
should be kept in mind is that section 44 of the Constitution allows the national sphere to 
legislate on planning matters which fall within Schedule 4 (including ‘municipal planning’), 
but it does not give the national sphere executive and administrative powers over ‘municipal 
planning’. This explains why the national sphere can pass legislation such as SPLUMA, but 
why SPLUMA does not permit executive functions and powers encompassed in ‘municipal 
planning’ to be undertaken by the national and provincial spheres.  I will expand on the 
constitutional mandate and scope of ‘municipal planning’ shortly. First, it is necessary to 
understand what these various constitutional planning competencies are and how they overlap 
and relate to one another. 
‘The boundaries between these four functional areas of planning are opaque, their precise 
content is not readily apparent, and overlaps, conflicts and uncertainty may occur’.21 As 
mentioned, ‘regional planning and development’ and ‘urban and rural development’ are within 
the concurrent control of the national and provincial spheres.22 
While this paper primarily focuses on the implementation of state infrastructure by organs of 
state as a national competency, it is nonetheless beneficial to define ‘provincial planning’ 
within the four functional areas of planning. This will provide the necessary context within 
                                                          
19 The Constitution, Schedule 4 Part A. 
20 Ibid, Schedule 4 Part B. 
21 J Van Wyk, ‘Planning in all its (dis)guises: Spheres of government, functional areas and authority’, 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 2012 (15) 5, 288. 
22 The Constitution, Schedule 4 Part A. 
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which to understand the definitions of the other three functional areas of planning. In Wary 
Holdings the court held that ‘provincial planning’ does not include ‘municipal planning’.23 
While this may seem logical, obvious and ultimately unhelpful, the ever-expanding definition 
of ‘municipal planning’ thus affects the definition of ‘provincial planning’, which, by 
definition, becomes clearer by what it cannot be. Therefore, ‘provincial planning’ is provincial 
planning and development excluding ‘municipal planning’. 
‘Urban and rural development’ was defined in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case as ‘the 
establishment of financing schemes for development, the creation of bodies to undertake 
housing schemes or to build urban infrastructure, the setting of development standards to be 
applied by municipalities, and so on.’24 The term ‘development’ within the context of ‘urban 
and rural development’ was held to be interpreted restrictively in order to preserve the veracity 
of ‘municipal planning’.25 Thus, ‘urban and rural development’ is concerned with the setting 
and maintaining of essential national standards and providing for uniformity in development 
across the country.26 Similar to ‘provincial planning’ though, it is also defined partly in terms 
of what it is not – ‘municipal planning’.   
‘Regional planning and development’ as listed in Schedule 4 refers to the forward planning of 
a specifically demarcated region, geographical or otherwise, for a specified purpose.27 A 
‘specified purpose’ would include the implementation of state infrastructure such as roads, 
railways and power lines. Thus, ‘regional planning and development’ is the functional area of 
planning in which the implementation of state infrastructure resides. Again, the definition does 
not however extend to the planning functions as defined in ‘municipal planning’.  
Given the substantial impact of ‘municipal planning’ on the other three functional areas of 
planning, it is vital that one understands the scope and content of ‘municipal planning’. In the 
Gauteng Development Tribunal case, the Constitutional Court agreed with the definition 
provided in the SCA: 
                                                          
23 Para 127. 
24 Para 62. 
25 Para 63. 
26 J Van Wyk, ‘Planning in all its (dis)guises: Spheres of government, functional areas and authority’, 305. 
27 Ibid. 
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‘’planning’, in the context of municipal affairs is a term which has assumed a particular, well-
established meaning which includes the zoning of land and the establishment of townships. In 
that context, the term is commonly used to define the control and regulation of the use of land’.28 
Succinctly put, ‘municipal planning’ is ‘the control and regulation of land use at a municipal 
level, the zoning of land and establishment of townships.’29 As discussed extensively above, 
the other three functional planning areas cannot usurp a municipality’s control in this regard. 
Any control exercised by a national or provincial authority in pursuance of the other functional 
planning areas which included or provided for an aspect covered by ‘municipal planning’ 
would be unconstitutional. Examples of this will be gleaned from a study of the case law below. 
A much-quoted dictum from the Gauteng Development Tribunal case is:  
‘It is, however, true that the functional areas allocated to the various spheres of government are 
not contained in hermetically sealed compartments. But that notwithstanding, they remain 
distinct from one another. This is the position even in respect of functional areas that share the 
same wording like roads, planning, sport and others. The distinctiveness lies in the level at which 
a particular power is exercised.’30  
It has, however, been argued that by distinguishing the powers such as zoning, sub-divisions, 
township establishment, and the general control of the use of land as part of ‘municipal 
planning’ the proposition is created that this element of planning is in fact hermetically sealed.31 
Therefore, where, for instance, the planning and establishment of a national road instituted in 
terms of ‘regional planning and development’ resulted in a change of zoning or required sub-
divisions, this part of the planning could not constitutionally be incorporated in that level/area 
of planning. It would require separate ‘municipal planning’ approval lest it encroached into 
that functional planning area reserved for municipalities. This concept will be revisited later 
when considering the decision of Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town.32  
Now that one understands the content and meaning of the constitutional functional planning 
areas, it is necessary to consider the extent of their application. ‘Municipal planning’ 
encompasses the complete geographical extent of South Africa. This is because of the adoption 
of ‘wall-to-wall’ municipalities. Briefly, section 151(1) of the Constitution requires the 
                                                          
28 Para 27. 
29 Le Sueur v eThekwini Municipality [2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013) para 16. 
30 Para 55. 
31 T Humby, ‘Hands on or hands off? The Constitutional Court’s denial of a provincial municipal planning role’, 
TSAR, 2015(1), 184. 
322012 (4) SA 181 (CC). 
9 
 
establishment of local authorities, protecting their status as the third sphere of government, 
throughout the overall territory of South Africa. ‘The effect of this section is that the whole 
territory of South Africa must be demarcated to fall in the jurisdiction or under the control of 
local government’.33 This total demarcation is often referred to as ‘wall-to-wall’ 
municipalities.34 The effect of wall-to-wall municipalities is that there is no geographical area 
which is excluded from ‘municipal planning’. 
 
Case Law clarifying the Constitutional position on the functional areas of planning law 
Planning competencies within the context of wall-to-wall municipalities were initially raised 
in the case of Wary Holdings and then dealt with in more detail in the Gauteng Development 
Tribunal case. Wary Holdings dealt with the application of the Subdivision of Agricultural 
Land Act35, which forbids the subdivision of agricultural land (farms) without the Minister of 
Agriculture’s consent. As mentioned previously, the subdivision of land falls squarely within 
the purview of municipalities whose geographical jurisdiction, with the adoption of wall-to-
wall demarcations, naturally included all agricultural land. The question which had to be 
determined in Wary Holdings was whether the Minister of Agriculture (representing a national 
department) still had jurisdiction over these subdivisions in terms of Act 70 of 1970 (national 
legislation) or whether the establishment of wall-to-wall municipalities, where subdivisions 
clearly fell into the category of ‘municipal planning’, altered this position. The majority 
decision in the Constitutional Court held that the duration of a classification of land as 
agricultural would continue36 and decided the matter on the literal meaning of the provisio 
rather than through the avenues of planning competencies of the spheres of government and 
planning law principles.37 The minority judgment preferred to decide the case on the functional 
areas of planning and held that to continue to allow this planning function to be controlled by 
the Minister of Agriculture (the national sphere of government) would negate the role of 
‘municipal planning’ and was not constitutionally permissible. This was the first inkling one 
got that in the new planning regime, a top down approach to planning, whereby the national 
sphere had an open hand insofar as planning decisions and authorisations were concerned, 
                                                          
33 Bekink B, ‘South African local government demarcation 2000: some points of interest’, 33 De Jure (2000), 
321. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Act 70 of 1970. 
36 Para 62. 
37 Van Wyk J, Planning Law, 187. 
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would not pass muster. It spelt the end of an era where the previous tiers of government could 
impose their planning will on the next tier down. 
Following Wary Holdings this inkling was confirmed.  The issue of planning competencies and 
functions between the various spheres of government arose again in the Constitutional Court 
in the Gauteng Development Tribunal cases. As seen, this judgement has had a profound effect 
on the interpretation of constitutional planning competencies and consequently how planning 
law is conducted in South Africa. Briefly, the facts giving rise to the ultimate constitutional 
challenge arose out of three matters dealing with planning decisions taken by the Gauteng 
Development Tribunal. The Gauteng Development Tribunal was established in  terms of the 
DFA– national legislation. The Tribunal was a provincial body established in terms of the DFA 
to make planning decisions in terms of that Act. Concurrently, the Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality was competent to take the same or similar decisions in terms of their planning 
policies established in terms of the Town Planning and Townships Ordinance38. The Ordinance 
was provincial legislation but which gave a municipality, such as the Johannesburg Metro, the 
power to make planning decisions within their jurisdiction. This created a situation where there 
were parallel processes in practice and an applicant essentially had a choice of making a 
planning application to either the Johannesburg Metro or the Gauteng Development Tribunal. 
This was bound to create a conflict where one authority approved or rejected a planning 
application which the other authority deemed undesirable/desirable and in the same 
circumstances would have approved/rejected the application. Sure enough, three such decisions 
did just that.  
One decision related to a rezoning and the other two related to housing developments (township 
establishments) all within the Johannesburg Metro geographical area and planning jurisdiction. 
In these instances, planning applications were made to the Gauteng Development Tribunal in 
terms of the DFA. The Johannesburg Metro, for various reasons, opposed all three planning 
applications. Nonetheless, the Gauteng Development Tribunal approved the applications 
despite the Johannesburg Metro’s objections. The Johannesburg Metro unilaterally took the 
position not to recognise the approvals granted by the Development Tribunals. The Metro 
approached the High Court for a declaratory order relating to the powers granted to the Gauteng 
Development Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal in terms of the DFA. The Metro also sought to 
have the aforementioned approvals reviewed and set aside. 
                                                          
38 15 of 1986. 
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The court a quo determined that the DFA operated as parallel planning legislation which 
provided applicants with a constitutionally permissible alternative.39 The Metro appealed to the 
SCA which upheld the appeal.40 The SCA based its decision on the definition of ‘municipal 
planning’ and the fact that ‘municipal planning’ was an exclusive competency of the local 
sphere. The SCA held that the Constitution could not be interpreted to confine the powers of 
municipalities in terms of ‘municipal planning’ to the preparation of plans in the abstract with 
no power to implement them.41 It held further that to allow the Development Tribunal the power 
to intervene with the decisions and objectives of the Municipality is a recipe for chaos and 
would be disruptive to a system of orderly planning and development within a municipal area.42 
The SCA therefore determined that Chapters 5 and 6 of the DFA were indeed unconstitutional. 
The matter was referred to the Constitutional Court to confirm the order of invalidity and decide 
a number of ancillary issues. The Constitutional Court delved into an examination of the 
various forms of planning conferred on the different spheres of government. The outcome of 
this examination clarified (although not entirely so) the four different functional areas of 
planning law. This has been dealt with in detail above but essentially it was held that ‘urban 
and rural development’ is not broad enough to encompass the powers forming part of 
‘municipal planning’.43 For this reason, the authority exercised by a provincial body (the 
Development Tribunal) in terms of national legislation (DFA) for the establishment of 
townships, rezoning, and sub-divisions could not pass constitutional muster and thus the 
legislation granting such powers stood to be set aside. So as not to create pandemonium within 
the planning fraternity, the invalidity of the offending Chapters in the DFA was suspended for 
a period allowing parliament to correct the defect or enact new legislation.44 Ultimately, 
parliament elected to enact new legislation and this legislation would be SPLUMA. 
Following the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, the case of Maccsand arose. The facts in 
this matter were that Maccsand had applied and had been granted mining rights in terms of the 
Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act45 (MPRDA). Maccsand commenced 
mining an area which had not been zoned appropriately in terms of the Western Cape Land 
                                                          
39 2008 (4) SA 572 (W). 
40 2010 (2) BCLR 157 (SCA). 
41 Para 38. 
42 Para 12. 
43 Para 63. 
44 J Van Wyk, Planning Law, 194. 
45 Act 28 of 2002. 
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Use and Planning Ordinance46 (LUPO) to allow the use of the land for mining. The City of 
Cape Town Municipality argued that Maccsand could not mine the property without first 
having attained the necessary planning authorisation zoning the land appropriately. Maccsand 
argued that once a mining right or permit had been granted, the holder has a right to undertake 
mining at the location and no other law or authority may ‘veto’ the decision taken by the 
relevant minister or delegate.47 The argument relied on the supposition that national legislation 
and interests outweighed provincial and municipal legislation and interests. ‘The view of the 
Department of Mineral Resources was that the granting of mining rights and the control over 
mining activities was the exclusive preserve of the national government and that no other 
authorisation was required’.48 The matter also made its way to the Constitutional Court, where 
again the question of the various constitutional functions between the spheres of government 
was to be considered. The court held that mining was indeed an exclusive competence of the 
national sphere of government, but that the planning legislation did not seek to regulate 
mining.49 The planning legislation enabled the exercise of ‘municipal planning’ an exclusive 
competence of local government. The laws serve different purposes: one regulates mining (a 
national competency); the other regulates municipal planning (a municipal competency). ‘An 
overlap between the two functions occurs owing to the fact that mining is carried out on land. 
This overlap does not constitute an impermissible intrusion by one sphere into the area of 
another because spheres of government do not operate in sealed compartments.’50 The court 
held that where a municipality refused a planning application for mining but where a mining 
right had already been granted in terms of the national legislation, this did not constitute a veto 
of the decision by one sphere, even though the applicant would not be able to implement his 
rights granted in terms of the national legislation. Neither sphere is intruding on the functional 
area of the other; each would be exercising its power within its own competence. There would 
be no veto as no one sphere is overriding the other. Instead, the refusal would be that the first 
decision cannot be put into operation.51 For these reasons, Maccsand’s case was dismissed and 
they were unable to mine the property for which they had mining rights until they had parallel 
planning and environmental authorisations. 
                                                          
46 15 of 1985. 
47 J Van Wyk, Planning Law, 196. 
48 J van Wyk in ND King et al, Fuggle and Rabie’s Environmental Management in South Africa, 1174. 
49 Para 42. 
50 Para 43. 
51 Para 48. 
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Importantly the court held that in these types of situations ‘the Constitution obliges these 
spheres of government to co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith and to co-
ordinate actions taken with one another’.52 It was held further that the difficulties experienced 
may be resolved through co-operation between the two organs of state, failing which, the 
refusal may be challenged on review.53 For the purposes of this paper, this case, in particular, 
is significant as the court was tasked with weighing up a municipality’s powers in relation to 
‘municipal planning’ (local sphere legislation) against the implementation of national interests 
and national legislation apparently in conflict with these planning powers. It stated 
unequivocally that the spheres should endeavour to co-operate with each other in aligning their 
authorisations. It also referred to the administrative powers of review, which organs of state 
may have against one another where co-operation fails.  The implication of this case on the 
implementation of state infrastructure is therefore immense as it is analogous in providing the 
way in which organs of state should consider ‘municipal planning’ when exercising their duty 
to implement state infrastructure. 
The final case that will be dealt with in detail is Telkom SOC Ltd v Kalu NO54. This recent case 
was determined after the adoption of SPLUMA unlike the previous two cases. Kalu, the owner 
of a property zoned Single Residential 1, entered into an agreement with Telkom. Telkom is a 
licensee under the Electronic Communications Act55 (ECA) but also a state-owned company 
implementing infrastructure. The agreement permitted Telkom to lease a portion of Kalu’s 
property and erect a freestanding base telecommunication station (mast) in terms of the ECA. 
The mast was erected without building plan approval. The municipality’s planning bylaw 
prohibited the erection of masts with Single Residential 1 zoning.56 
Telkom argued that the bylaw was in conflict with national legislation and therefore invalid in 
terms of section 156(3) of the Constitution. They further argued that the bylaw overstepped the 
boundaries of ‘municipal planning’ and encroached into the area of ‘national planning’.57 The 
functional area of national planning encroached would be ‘regional planning and development’ 
for the reasons discussed above. 
                                                          
52 Para 47. 
53 Para 48. 
54 [2018] ZAWCHC 53. 
55 Act 36 of 2005 
56 Paras 5-6. 
57 Para 10. 
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Concerning the argument around the bylaw overstepping the boundaries of ‘municipal 
planning’, the court relied heavily on the interpretation of ‘municipal planning’ arising out of 
the Gauteng Development Tribunal case. It was held that the national and provincial powers 
exclude the powers of municipalities which had already been ‘carved out’ for municipalities.58 
The pertinent ‘carvings’ in this instance being ‘the control and regulation of the use of land 
within the municipal area, where the nature, scale and intensity of the land use do not affect 
the national interest’59 (emphasis added). The court therefore held that ‘municipal planning’ 
includes the regulation of the use of land for masts. 
Regarding the argument that the bylaw was in conflict with national legislation and therefore 
constitutionally invalid, the court examined the wording of relevant provisions of the ECA and 
the intention of the legislature. From the basis that the regulation of the land use for masts fell 
within the ambit of ‘municipal planning’, the court then importantly referred to section 151(4) 
of the Constitution: ‘the national and provincial government may not compromise or impede a 
municipality’s ability or right to exercise its powers or perform its functions’.60 The court went 
on to hold that the bylaw cannot be interpreted to mean that the municipality wishes to regulate 
the system of telecommunication.61 Similarly, there is nothing in the provisions of the ECA 
that indicates that its purpose is to regulate zoning or land use. Furthermore, section 22(1), the 
provision of the ECA, on which Telkom relied, did not exempt a licensee from obtaining a 
rezoning as required by law.62 As seen, the court relied heavily on the reasoning for the decision 
in Maccsand and stated that the facts contained therein and issues to be determined in the 
Telkom case were similar if not directly analogous.63 It is then not surprising that the court 
concluded that there was no conflict between the bylaw and the ECA as argued by Telkom. 
Telkom therefore failed in both arguments. The decision in this case further confirmed, firstly, 
the powers held by municipalities relating to ‘municipal planning’ and, secondly, the non-
conflict of planning bylaws with national legislation that has a planning consequence but does 
not expressly provide for planning competencies. 
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Cooperative Governance 
Provided for in SPLUMA and a thread running through the case law on the matter as well as 
stand-alone legislation, is the concept and call for co-operative government and inter-
governmental relations. This concept and duty on all spheres of government arises from 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Section 41(1) provides the principles of co-operative government 
and the following are especially pertinent in the current context. This section provides that all 
spheres of government and all organs of state within each sphere must: respect the 
constitutional status, institutions, powers and functions of government in other spheres64; not 
assume any power or function except those conferred on them in terms of the Constitution65; 
co-operate with one another in mutual trust and good faith by informing one another of, and 
consulting one another on, matters of common interest66; and co-ordinate their actions and 
legislation with one another.67  
‘The idea behind the list of principles [contained in section 41(1)] is to facilitate the proper 
exercise of power and functions between the different spheres, especially where there are 
conflicts or overlaps’.68 Fleshing out the principles set out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution is 
the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act69 (IRFA). This Act must be read alongside 
the provisions contained in SPLUMA for co-operative governance to get a full picture of the 
duties and obligations each sphere and organ of state has in relation to the other. The Act also 
provides for the manner in which disputes between government entities should be resolved. 
The courts have held that unless the national or provincial legislation specifically provides for 
municipal planning functions (zoning, sub-divisions, township establishment) to be performed 
by a national or provincial department  then there is no apparent conflict. However, there is 
certainly an overlap and thus Chapter 3 of the Constitution and the IRFA should be kept in 
mind when figuring out the way in which to administer national legislation for the 
implementation of state infrastructure, which naturally overlaps with local planning bylaws. 
SPLUMA recognises this constitutional obligation and, using the example of SANRAL, the 
implication and practical challenges in discharging this obligation will be seen below. 
                                                          
64 Section 41(1)(e). 
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67 Section 41(1)(h)(iv). 
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SPLUMA 
As mentioned, after the decision in the Gauteng Development Tribunal case, Parliament elected 
to overhaul the planning legislation in South Africa and this culminated in the adoption of 
SPLUMA. SPLUMA had some arguably unintended, yet profound, implications on the 
implementation of state infrastructure. These will be explored shortly using the SANRAL 
example. 
SPLUMA was enacted on 1 July 2015. As such, it is still a relatively new piece of legislation. 
The result is that there is little guidance by the courts as to the interpretation of SPLUMA, or 
the judicial considerations of the constitutionality of a number of the provisions contained in 
SPLUMA.70 The lengthy preamble to SPLUMA sets out, among other things, the erstwhile 
fragmented system of planning across the spheres of government and speaks to how ‘various 
laws governing land use give rise to uncertainty about the status of municipal spatial planning 
and land use management systems and procedures and frustrates the achievement of 
cooperative governance and the promotion of public interest’.71 This section of the preamble 
effectively captures the discussions above. 
SPLUMA cements local government’s role and powers insofar as they relate to ‘municipal 
planning’ by defining ‘land development’72 and dictating that an application must be made to 
a municipality for the approval of any ‘land development’73. ‘‘Land development’ means the 
erection of buildings or structures on land, or the change of use of land, including township 
establishment, the subdivision or consolidation of land, or any deviation from the land uses 
permitted in terms of an applicable land use scheme’.74 It is hard to escape the glaring 
similarities between this definition of ‘land development’ and the courts’ interpretation of 
‘municipal planning’. Thus, it has to be accepted that all land development constitutes, or at 
least falls within the ambit of, ‘municipal planning’ requiring authorisation from a local 
authority. 
                                                          
70 N Laubscher, L Hoffman, E Drewes, J Nysschen, SPLUMA A Practical Guide (Lexis Nexis 2016) vi. 
 
71 SPLUMA Preamble. 
72 Section 1. 
73 Section 33(1). 
74 Section 1. 
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Where state infrastructure is concerned, one would be hard pressed to argue that state 
infrastructure would not constitute ‘land development’. The erection of power lines, the laying 
of railway tracks, construction of national roads and so on is clearly the ‘erection of…structures 
on land’.75 Furthermore, as a consequence of the implementation of state infrastructure there 
will necessarily be sub-divisions, consolidations and rezoning. It follows then that no state 
infrastructure can be constructed without following the provisions of SPLUMA. This creates 
far-reaching implications for organs of state tasked with the implementation of infrastructure 
and has the potential to cause inordinate delays in the delivery of this infrastructure while 
organs of state await municipal planning approvals prior to construction. The result of such 
delays would be that the citizens of South Africa are deprived of much needed infrastructure 
projects pending municipal planning approvals. SPLUMA provides potential remedies for this 
situation but as will be seen, none of these remedies is as straightforward as they seem.  
 
SPLUMA – Spatial Development Frameworks 
SPLUMA provides for the adoption of Spatial Development Frameworks at national, 
provincial and municipal level. An SDF can be defined as ‘a strategic indicative framework 
that seeks to guide overall spatial distribution of current and desirable future land uses within 
a specific sphere in order to give effect to development vision, goals and objectives’.76 Section 
12(2)(a) states that the spheres of government must participate in the spatial planning and land 
use management processes that impact on one another to ensure that the plans and programmes 
are co-ordinated, consistent and in harmony with each other. Unlike the spheres of government, 
where hierarchical ‘tiers’ have been eliminated, SPLUMA provides clearly for ‘tiers’ of SDFs. 
The tiers are created because a provincial SDF must be consistent with the national SDF,77 a 
regional SDF must be consistent with a provincial and national SDF,78 and a municipal SDF 
must assist in integrating, coordinating, aligning and expressing development policies and 
plans emanating from the various sectors of the spheres of government as they apply within 
the municipal area.79 
                                                          
75 Section 1. 
76 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, SPLUMA Core Training Materials: Participant 
Workbook, pg 81. 
77 Section 15(2). 
78 Section 19(1)(b). 
79 Section 12(5). 
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In an ideal situation, state infrastructure plans would be contained in the national SDF which 
would contain details of current and planned state infrastructure. This information would 
percolate down through the SDFs so that these current and future plans are incorporated into 
the provincial, regional and Municipal SDFs. In this ideal situation, the manner of dealing with 
spatial planning would be first to execute the spatial planning on a macro scale (national, 
regional and provincial) and then execute the micro spatial planning (municipal and precinct).80 
However, in reality, the opposite is true. Most municipalities have adopted Land Use Schemes 
and SDFs while the macro-spatial planning is yet to be finalised. Additionally, the content of 
the draft national SDF is broad stroked in nature, providing for broad development trends, but 
scant on the inclusion of detailed infrastructure plans.81 It is therefore unlikely that intricate 
details of current and future state infrastructure would be included in municipal SDFs. It also 
makes the task of organs of state getting the eventual necessary municipal planning approval, 
that much more difficult.  
There is also a clear monetary consequence for organs of state in circumstances where state 
infrastructure plans have not been catered for by municipalities in their SDF or Land Use 
Scheme. Where these plans have not been incorporated in the municipal SDF or Land Use 
Scheme, then a situation may arise where a municipality grants development rights in a 
property earmarked for state infrastructure. The granting of these rights could drastically 
increase the value of the property resulting in a premium being paid by the organ of state when 
it eventually compensates the owner for the property required for the implementation of state 
infrastructure. In certain circumstances, where a developer has substantially developed a 
property, it may no longer be viable to implement the state infrastructure and a less desirable 
route would need to be adopted. This would be to the detriment of the public.  
A look at the case of Reflect-All 1025 CC v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government82 provides an interesting vantage point. This case dealt with 
the constitutionality of certain provisions of the provincial Gauteng Transport Infrastructure 
Act83. The provisions provided for the protection and preservation of historical road corridors 
needed for the future implementation of provincial road infrastructure – ‘effectively, the area 
within the road or rail reserve is frozen. It can only be used for its designated purpose’84. It was 
                                                          
80 N Laubscher et al, SPLUMA A Practical Guide, 136. 
81 Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, Draft NDF Presentation 27 July 2018. 
82 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
83 Act 8 of 2001. 
84 Para 23. 
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argued that the provisions deprived owners of their property rights and amounted to a form of 
expropriation, as these affected owners were unable to develop their properties. The 
Infrastructure Act allowed an owner to make application to the MEC for amendment to the 
planned corridor so as to enable development in certain circumstances where, for one reason 
or another, the historical planning was no longer applicable. The court held that the 
Infrastructure Act ‘strikes a balance between the Province’s legitimate interest in protecting 
the hypothetical road network on the one hand, whilst ensuring that individual property rights 
are protected on the other’.85 The court appreciated and stressed the importance of preserving 
the historical infrastructure planning.86 The sentiments of the Constitutional Court in this case 
regarding the importance of the protection of historical infrastructure plans is noteworthy. The 
decision reiterates the importance of preserving historical infrastructure plans. It is stressed that 
the best way of protecting the integrity of infrastructure plans is to ensure that a local authority 
takes account of current and future plans in their SDF and Land Use Management System. If 
this is done, then by implication it will ensure that inflated compensation is not paid by an 
organ of state, or that infrastructure plans are not relegated because private development has 
made them no longer feasible. 
 
SANRAL infrastructure as an example of how implementation of state infrastructure is 
impeded by local planning authorisations 
What has become clear from the growing precedent and interpretation of the Constitutional 
provisions discussed in detail above is that the implementation of state infrastructure by organs 
of state in terms of their enabling legislation, does not exempt these organs of state from 
complying with local planning legislation and getting municipal planning approval. This was 
put beyond doubt with the enactment of SPLUMA. At this stage, it is helpful to use this 
supposition and apply it to the example of SANRAL. 
SANRAL is an organ of state constituted in terms of national legislation (the SANRAL Act) 
and constitutionally mandated to implement national road infrastructure in South Africa. The 
constitutional mandate arises because ‘national roads’ does not appear in either Schedule 4 or 
Schedule 5 of the Constitution unlike ‘provincial roads’87 and ‘municipal roads’88. ‘National 
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roads’ is not listed and has not been assigned by national government to provincial government 
or local government. The SANRAL Act and the non-assignment of the function to provincial 
or local government means that the administration of matters relating to national roads and the 
implementation of national road infrastructure is clearly a functional area of national 
government. 
In terms of SANRAL’s planning competencies arising out of the SANRAL Act, SANRAL ‘is 
responsible for and given power to perform all strategic planning with regard to the South 
African national roads system, as well as the planning, design, construction, operation, 
management, control, maintenance and rehabilitation of national roads for the Republic’89 
(emphasis added). Further, section 26(w) allows SANRAL to do anything else which is 
reasonably ancillary to any of its main functions and powers in terms of section 25. In 
pursuance of these objects, section 41 of the SANRAL Act gives SANRAL the power to 
recommend that the Minister expropriate properties and portions of property which are required 
for national road purposes.  
A national road is declared by description or coordinates and this declaration is gazetted.90 The 
effect of a declaration is that all the statutory provisions and uses associated with national roads 
in terms of the SANRAL Act are then applicable to the area declared.91 Another pertinent 
provision of the SANRAL Act, which directly relates to spatial planning, is section 49. This 
section provides that SANRAL’s approval is necessary where land is to be subdivided but falls 
within a national road reserve or building restriction area. While not exactly the same, other 
organs of state implementing state infrastructure have similar empowering legislation and 
powers which have an impact on spatial planning and particularly ‘municipal planning’, which 
facilitate and expedite the implementation of state infrastructure. 
Historically when a national road was designed, affected owners were consulted and their 
property was acquired by agreement or, where necessary, by expropriation for the purposes of 
the national road. Sometimes, whole properties were acquired; sometimes only portions of 
properties were acquired for these purposes. This resulted in numerous subdivisions and, 
occasionally, consolidations having to be registered. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the 
declaration of an area as a national road effectively changed the land use. This is particularly 
so after the road was constructed and the land use of a Road Reserve was clearly used for 
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national road purposes. From the discussion above, it is clear that these actions all fall within 
the ambit of ‘municipal planning’ and are now subject to SPLUMA.  
Historically, Surveyor General Diagrams (SG Diagrams) for the abovementioned subdivisions 
and consolidations were prepared and approved by the Surveyor General in terms of the Land 
Survey Act92 and the properties were registered in SANRAL’s name in terms of the Deed’s 
Registries Act93 read with section 55 of the SANRAL Act. Section 6(1)(b) of the Land Survey 
Act provides that before any registration is effected in a deeds registry, an SG must examine 
and approve diagrams which have been prepared in accordance with the Act and, when 
applicable, are in accordance with any statutory consent. Prior to the enactment of SPLUMA, 
the only statutory consent required by the SG in these instances was SANRAL’s in terms of 
the planning provisions referred to in section 25 of the SANRAL Act above. SANRAL and 
other organs of state are exempt from requiring the Minister of Agriculture’s consent in terms 
of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.94 
Prior to the implementation of SPLUMA, the contention is not that no spatial planning had 
been undertaken by an organ of state, but rather that the relevant local municipality had not 
always formally endorsed or even been aware of the spatial planning undertaken. After the 
enactment of SPLUMA, the registration of these subdivisions and consolidations was no longer 
possible. Section 53 of SPLUMA states ‘the registration of any property resulting from a land 
development application may not be performed unless the municipality certifies that all 
requirements and conditions for the approval have been complied with’. As mentioned, the 
implementation of national roads, which is state infrastructure, fell within the SPLUMA 
definition of ‘land development’. In terms of the Land Survey Act, an SG is now obliged to 
request the section 53 consent from a local authority and as such, statutory consent clearly falls 
within the ambit of section 6(1)(b). Furthermore, SPLUMA provides that:  
‘except as provided for in this Act, no legislation not repealed by this Act may prescribe an 
alternative or parallel mechanism, measure, institution or system on spatial planning, land use, 
land use management and land development in a manner inconsistent with this Act.’95 
Therefore, the planning provisions in organs of states’ enabling legislation must yield to the 
provisions of SPLUMA where there is a conflict. This means that, following the enactment of 
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SPLUMA, despite empowering provisions in other legislation, no subdivision or consolidation 
diagram will be approved by an SG without an accompanying municipal consent. This 
obviously creates a problem with the historical way in which the state infrastructure was 
implemented, as prior to the enactment of SPLUMA, no consent was required. Organs of state 
thus need to adapt the way in which they design and plan state infrastructure in order to ensure 
that they are able to formalise this planning with municipalities in due course. 
The issue of land use and zoning of state infrastructure also needs to be addressed in the context 
of ‘municipal planning’ and SPLUMA. The reason for this is that the implementation of state 
infrastructure, in the majority of instances, results in the changing of one land use to another. 
Following the SANRAL example, the use of the land is typically changed from ‘agriculture’ 
to ‘transportation’. This change of land use need not necessarily lead to a rezoning and the 
concomitant land development application for such. ‘One should be mindful of the fact that 
‘municipal planning’ for the purposes of SPLUMA has a wider meaning to include strategic 
planning and not only land use management as in the common meaning of municipal 
planning’.96 The change of land use and zoning falls within the definition of ‘land 
development’97 and would ordinarily require that a development application be submitted to a 
municipality in terms of section 33(1). In this context, it is argued that land use and zoning for 
state infrastructure is not directly affected by the enactment of SPLUMA but should, 
nonetheless, be formalised and aligned between local authorities and organs of state in the 
interests of co-operative government as discussed in detail above.  
‘Land Use’ is defined in SPLUMA as ‘the purpose for which land is or may be used lawfully 
in terms of…any other authorisation, permit or consent issued by a competent authority, and 
includes any conditions related to such land use purposes’.98 It is important to note that the way 
in which this definition is framed means that there are a number of ways in which land use can 
be lawfully exercised including authorisations, permits or consents issued by a competent 
authority.99 An organ of state may be a competent authority where its enabling legislation 
provides planning competencies connected to such organ of state’s duty to utilise land for state 
infrastructure. An organ of state acting in terms of a permission, permit or consent, issued in 
terms of that enabling legislation, would therefore not be acting in conflict with the provisions 
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of SPLUMA. This is in line with idea of SPLUMA providing a framework for ‘strategic 
planning’ and not just ‘municipal planning’. An organ of state’s enabling legislation would 
also not fall foul of section 2(2) in this instance, as the land use provisions in its enabling 
legislation would be consistent with SPLUMA. It would still be necessary though to integrate 
and align these lawful land uses with a municipality’s Land Use Management Scheme and 
SDF. This would further be in line with the duty imposed in section 9(3) of SPLUMA and the 
principles of co-operative government already discussed.100 
Another issue arising and not addressed in SPLUMA is the scenario where an expropriation 
takes place and illogical planning consequences potentially follow. In terms of the 
Expropriation Act101, ownership passes to the authority expropriating the property on date of 
expropriation.102 The date of expropriation is the date stated in the notice of expropriation 
delivered to the owner of the property.103 The minister may also expropriate portions of 
immovable property in terms of the Act.104 Where a minister expropriates a portion of a 
property, then sufficient particulars must be given in order for an owner to determine the 
position and extent of that portion in relation to the whole property.105  The result of this is that 
a determinable portion of property may be expropriated in which ownership in that 
expropriated portion vests in the state but where this portion has not been recorded separately 
in the SG’s office or registered in the Deeds Office. Therefore, a subdivision is created through 
expropriation and vesting of ownership but not formalised until a separate SG diagram is 
approved and title registered in terms of section 31 of the Deeds Registries Act. As dealt with, 
the approval of the SG diagram is again subject to the planning consent of a municipality in 
terms of SPLUMA. The illogical consequence arises where a municipality potentially refuses 
to give subdivision planning approval. This creates a situation where the ownership in a 
determinable portion of land is vested in the State but where the State is not able to subdivide 
and formally take transfer of this portion as they cannot get the SG to approve it and 
subsequently will not be able to get registered title. This situation can be rectified through an 
agreement in terms of section 29 of SPLUMA, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter, or where a municipality provides for the situation in their bylaws. 
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Possible ways in which SPLUMA and municipal bylaws can be utilised to avoid a full 
development application  
On the topic of municipal bylaws, at this stage it is important to note that most, if not all of the 
issues raised can be resolved through municipalities’ land use and planning bylaws if provision 
for them has been made therein. As one will appreciate, following the discussion of wall-to-
wall municipalities, there are 278 municipalities in South Africa, comprising eight 
metropolitan, 44 district and 226 local municipalities.106 This means that there may be up to 
278 different sets of planning bylaws each providing for a different process to be adopted in 
considering and making decisions regarding land development applications (which includes 
state infrastructure as mentioned). Chapter 6 of SPLUMA provides the framework within 
which a municipality develops land use and planning bylaws which deal with land development 
applications. In terms of section 54(e) of SPLUMA, the Minister may make regulations 
consistent with SPLUMA prescribing procedures concerning the lodging of applications and 
the consideration and decision of such applications. The Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management Regulations: Land Use Management and General Matters, 2015 were published 
by the Minister in March 2015107 and came into operation on 13 November 2015108.109 
‘Regulation 14(1)(a) stipulates that a municipality must determine the manner and format in 
which land development and land use applications must be submitted.’110 
In certain instances, a municipality, in its bylaws, has exempted organs of state from having to 
make development applications for the implementation of state infrastructure or sub-divisional 
approval for expropriations (City of Cape Town111, and a number of municipalities in the 
Eastern Cape for example). In this instance, one need only draw the attention of the SG and 
Deeds Office to the relevant exemption in order to formalise the planning of that organ of state. 
Some municipalities make provision for a process to apply for exemption from making 
application in certain circumstances (City of Johannesburg for example112). The exemption 
issued by the municipality is then provided to the SG and Deeds Office. Others may opt for a 
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shortened procedure where it is still necessary to make a land development application in terms 
of the bylaws but where the application is expedited through shortened timeframes and/or does 
not require all of the information that would normally accompany a land development 
application – for instance advertising the development application, and/or having to get 
comment from a multitude of line departments. Following a shortened procedure, a section 53 
consent would be issued and this would be supplied to the SG and Deeds Office to formalise 
the planning. Finally, some municipalities (City of Tshwane113) do not make provision for 
exemption or shortened procedures and treat organs of state as ordinary developers instituting 
ordinary land development. In this scenario, the organ of state is required to make a land 
development application in the ordinary course in order to be issued a section 53 consent at the 
end. This situation can lead to serious delays as a result of the drawn out process of getting 
comment from various departments, public participation procedures and consideration by 
Municipal Planning Tribunals. In order to avert these delays, it is necessary to contemplate 
other approaches provided for in SPLUMA. 
Section 55 of SPLUMA provides for exemption from one or all of the provisions of the Act 
relating to a specified piece of land or area if it is in the public interest.114 It would be relatively 
straightforward to motivate that the implementation of state infrastructure is in the public 
interest for obvious reasons. The Minister of Rural Development and Land Reform115 on 
application would, by Notice in the Gazette, exempt an entity from one or all of the provisions 
of the Act.116 It is conceivable to use this section to expedite land development applications for 
the implementation of state infrastructure. Using the SANRAL example, one would specify the 
area on which a road was to be constructed and apply to the Minister to exempt SANRAL from 
having to make development applications to the municipality for this area in terms of SPLUMA 
and the municipal planning bylaws. While this may seem like a good idea, it is fraught with 
practical difficulties and the section of SPLUMA has come under heavy criticism.  
The practical difficulties for an organ of state to rely on this section are numerous. Firstly, the 
section provides that the Minister may exempt an applicant. Thus, valuable time would be 
wasted where an application for exemption was made only for the Minister to refuse to grant 
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the exemption. It is also likely that because such an application would not ordinarily be part of 
the day-to-day duties that the Minister deals with, a decision and the gazetting where the 
application was granted, would not be a swift exercise. Secondly, a close reading of the 
provision reveals that the request may only be made by a municipality or province. This is 
perhaps an oversight by the legislators, but this nonetheless excludes an organ of state making 
such a request of their own volition. To utilize this section for state infrastructure, the organ of 
state would need to motivate to a municipality or a province to make the request on their behalf. 
Therefore, the organ of state would be completely reliant on the cooperation and agreement of 
a municipality or province even to attempt to utilise this provision. Finally, it has been argued 
that ‘the subsection offends against the objects of SPLUMA as set out in section 3 and the 
[constitutional] principles stated in section 41(1) of the Constitution, and the inclusion thereof 
in SPLUMA is simply indefensible and unjustifiable’.117 Thus, even if an organ of state jumped 
through the aforementioned hoops, there is a real possibility that the provision they rely on 
would not pass constitutional muster if challenged and in that circumstance, their efforts would 
amount to nought. It would have only resulted in a colossal waste of time. For these reasons, it 
is submitted that section 55 of SPLUMA is not the answer to the difficulties faced in 
implementing planning for state infrastructure. 
Section 52 of SPLUMA may also seem like an extremely attractive provision that organs of 
state could rely on for the formalisation of planning for state infrastructure. Section 52 states 
‘a land development application must be referred to the Minister where such an application 
materially impacts on: matters within the exclusive functional area of the national sphere in 
terms of the Constitution118; strategic national policy objectives119 and land use for a purpose 
which falls within the functional area of the national sphere of government’.120 It is clear from 
the discussion earlier that state infrastructure falls within the functional area of the national 
sphere of government. In circumstances where a development application in the national 
interest has been referred to the Minister, the Minister may join as a party to the application121 
or direct that the application be referred to him to decide.122 At face value, this seems like a 
good way in which planning applications for state infrastructure can be expedited as the 
Minister can approve them without the necessity of having to follow the often-onerous 
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provisions of bylaws discussed. The reality is that section 52, much like section 55, is also 
fraught with practical difficulties. 
Firstly, the provision does not circumvent the necessity of having to first prepare and submit 
the application in terms of the municipal bylaws as the section expressly provides that the 
application should first be lodged with the relevant municipality.123 Secondly, the Minister’s 
decision or election to ‘join as a party’ or ‘decide the application’ is entirely discretionary and 
therefore it is not a foregone conclusion that the Minister will determine planning applications 
for state infrastructure. The Minister may join as a party, provide comment to the municipality 
that could assist in motivating the approval of the planning application, but would nevertheless 
not unburden an organ of state from then being embroiled in the often onerous municipal 
planning application process. The notion that the application be referred to the Minister for a 
decision is simply untenable. It is in conflict with the precedent set in Gauteng Development 
Tribunal and Maccsand. Furthermore, it is in conflict with section 35(1) of SPLUMA which 
states that a Municipal Planning Tribunal (MPT) determines the development application and 
not the Minister. This is seemingly reiterated in section 52(7). ‘It can safely be assumed that 
the Minister cannot consider and decide a development application as provided for in this 
subsection’.124 This section then, despite its title, does not provide the answer to implementing 
planning for state infrastructure. 
It will be argued that the answer to the ‘planning of state infrastructure’ conundrum lies in the 
oft-overlooked section 29 of SPLUMA. In the following Chapter this section will be explored 
in detail and it will be shown how the utilisation of an agreement provided for in this section 
ticks all of the boxes which the previous sections have failed to do. It provides a solution which 
is constitutionally acceptable, practical, expeditious, embodies the precepts of co-operative 
governance, and maintains the integrity of the different functions of the role-players involved.  
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Chapter 3: SPLUMA - Section 29 Agreement 
Section 29 comprises only three subsections and is headed ‘consultation with other land 
development authorities’. This is slightly confusing and would have been more aptly titled 
‘agreement with other land development authorities’. However, the title does not derogate from 
the content. Section 29(1) states: 
‘A municipality must consult any organ of state responsible for administering legislation relating 
to any aspect of an activity that also requires approval in terms of this Act in order to coordinate 
activities and give effect to the respective requirements of such legislation and to avoid 
duplication.’ 
While the onus is placed on a municipality to initiate such consultations, it is submitted that 
there is nothing barring another organ of state from initiating these consultations. Thus, an 
organ of state would be well advised to approach and consult with a municipality affected by 
the implementation of state infrastructure at the early stages of a project to ensure there are no 
fundamental planning differences between the parties. In the example utilised, SANRAL would 
be administering the ‘planning’ element provided for in section 25 of the SANRAL Act which 
planning aspect would also require an approval from a municipality. Section 29(1) would also 
be applicable where a municipality was granting a planning approval which affected the 
National Road Reserve as envisaged in section 59 of the SANRAL Act. As discussed above, 
section 59 requires SANRAL approval before any subdivision or township establishment 
approval can be granted. ‘The subsection recognises the interplay between different 
administrators executing different powers and functions in terms of different enabling 
enactments to authorise or permit the same or substantially the same activity’.125  
Further, the subsection refers to ‘any aspect of an activity that also requires approval in terms 
of SPLUMA’ (emphasis added). Thus, the obligation to consult extends beyond only 
subdivisions, consolidation and zonings and includes approval of IDPs, SDFs, 
suspension/amendment/removal of restrictive conditions, consent in terms of a condition title, 
conditions of establishment or an approval for township establishment.126 The scope of this 
subsection is necessarily wide and caters for the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Constitution as 
well as upholding the principles enunciated in cases such as Wary Holdings, Gauteng 
Development Tribunal and Maccsand. When interpreting this subsection, one must note that 
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each organ of state responsible for administering planning legislation (or legislation with 
planning aspects), has to make its own decision according to that enabling legislation and the 
criteria applicable therein.127 Therefore, even where the information being considered by the 
authorities is the same, such authority must make its decision against the factors and criteria 
relevant in their respective enabling legislation and the decisions must be reasonable and 
rational in light thereof. A municipality for instance cannot delegate its municipal planning 
decision in terms of SPLUMA and its bylaws to an organ of state to do so in terms of that 
organ’s enabling legislation. 
Section 29(2) of SPLUMA states: 
‘A municipality, in giving effect to Chapter 3 of the Constitution, may, after consultation with 
the organ of state contemplated in subsection (1), enter into a written agreement with that organ 
of state to avoid duplication in the submission of information or the carrying out of a process 
relating to any aspect of an activity that also requires authorisation under this Act.’ 
This section provides the crux of the answer to the conundrum raised at the outset. This 
subsection provides the legislative authority enabling a written agreement between organs of 
state and municipalities to be entered into. This vehicle can be used to address and enforce 
streamlined processes and avoid the ‘red tape’ which often hampers ordinary development 
applications. Entering into such an agreement, where bylaws have not provided a process to 
expedite the implementation of state infrastructure, allows the expedition of state infrastructure 
development outside of the bylaws. A criticism has been raised against this section in that it 
does not follow the principle in the preceding paragraph that organs of state and municipalities 
must make their own decision in terms of the relevant enabling legislation.128 It is argued that 
by entering into such an agreement, the parties may abdicate their respective statutory duties 
by agreeing that the other party can make a decision on their behalf. This may be true depending 
on the content of the agreement. It is therefore vital that the content of the agreement keeps in 
mind the specific authorisations and functions of the parties so as not to overstep the 
constitutional lines articulated in the aforementioned case law. 
Going back to the SANRAL example, the agreement would record the processes already 
carried out as part of the road development design and planning phase. In this instance the 
public participation undertaken as part of an EIA or the consultation and negotiations with 
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affected land owners and communities, may be sufficient to avoid duplicating a similar 
consultation process as part of a planning authorisation. Furthermore, the municipality may 
take account of the proposed subdivisions, consolidations, provisions for alternate accesses, 
closure of public places and so on, which have been prepared by SANRAL in terms of the 
planning aspect provided for in the SANRAL Act. A municipality, after satisfying itself that 
this planning is acceptable, would record as much in the agreement. Where a municipality is 
unsatisfied with the planning, for instance where a national road will dissect a community, the 
municipality has the ability during the ‘consultation’ referred to in the subsection to propose a 
planning solution (such as an overhead walkway) or propose a better suited route in line with 
the future planning of the municipality. It is submitted that the word ‘consultation’ in the 
subsection would be more appropriately called a ‘negotiation’ given the eventual consequence 
of an agreement. 
The subsection expressly refers to the agreement as giving effect to Chapter 3 of the 
Constitution. It is clear then that the intention of the legislature was to promote the spirit of 
cooperative governance through this process in order to avoid duplication of information and 
processes which inevitably delay development. It also provides for a scenario where the 
authorities can sit around a table and avoid the situation that arose in both the Maccsand and 
Telkom cases.  
While the following discussion is not an exhaustive list of what could be contained in the 
agreement, it does give one an idea of the power, nature and scope of a section 29 agreement. 
As mentioned, the agreement could record the non-necessity of a public participation process 
where some acceptable form of public participation on the project had already been concluded 
(for instance during an Environmental Impact Assessment in terms of the National 
Environmental Management Act129). The agreement could record the acceptable planning 
provisions provided in a design of the infrastructure including proposed sub-divisions and 
consolidations. A municipality could, of their own accord, undertake in the agreement to rezone 
the area on which the state infrastructure was to be implemented. The municipality could also 
undertake to amend its SDF in line with the proposed plans. The organ of state could undertake 
to provide specific acceptable planning solutions to areas of concern which may have arisen as 
part of the negotiations - the ‘overhead walkway’ situation referred to earlier for example. In 
terms of processes, the parties could agree to timelines within which planning approvals could 
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be provided once agreed information had been submitted. The agreement could go so far as to 
establish a committee or authorised official responsible for monitoring and facilitating the 
implementation of the agreement. It is envisaged that an agreement of this nature would be 
accompanied by extensive annexures such as draft SG diagrams, spatial plans illustrating the 
development, proof and outcomes of public participation undertaken in terms of another 
process, and any other documentation or information necessary to justify and/or elaborate on 
the state infrastructure development. 
By introducing and fleshing out the practicalities of the development in the annexures to the 
agreement, the agreement can be as specific or broad as the parties wish. For instance, the 
agreement could provide for the planning implications of over a hundred properties on a section 
of road spanning a number of kilometres. Such an extensive area covered by the agreement 
with the associated plethora of annexures which would need to accompany it may make the 
agreement cumbersome. It is therefore suggested that the agreement would be project-specific, 
dealing with up to twenty properties in an agreement in order to make a submission for planning 
approval in the next phase more manageable. 
The agreement would also include provision for a breach. This is vital to the enforceability of 
the agreement. Necessarily, where one party did not execute an obligation in terms of the 
agreement the other party could place that party in breach, calling for the breach to be remedied 
within a reasonable amount of time or a time stipulated in the agreement. Provision could even 
be built into the agreement where non-performance of the obligations flowing from the 
agreement results in a penalty being levied against the defaulting party. It must, however, be 
borne in mind that if a dispute arises, generally following a breach of the agreement, in which 
legal action is envisaged, the parties will still have to follow the provisions of the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act. In amplification of this, section 40(2) of the 
IRFA stipulates that ‘any formal agreement between two or more organs of state in different 
governments regulating the exercise of statutory powers or performance or functions…must 
include dispute-settlement mechanisms or procedures that are appropriate to the nature of the 
agreement and the matters that are likely to become the subject of dispute’. Following this 
section, it may also therefore be necessary to include provision for arbitration and mediation 
between the parties where a conflict arises. Not until the parties have followed the processes 
and procedures stated in the IRFA will they be able to approach a court to settle the dispute. 
This is inextricably linked to the rights, duties and obligations of the parties encompassed in 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution and discussed earlier. 
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The next practical issue which requires resolution is the aspect of signatories to the agreement. 
At this juncture it is important to stress the difference between signing the section 29 agreement 
and signing a planning approval arising out of the agreement. The issuing of approvals, and the 
necessary signing of such approvals, will be elucidated shortly during the discussion of section 
29(3). Section 29(2) refers to a ‘municipality’ entering into the agreement. The general 
principle is that the person signing the agreement from both the organ of state and the 
municipality, must have the authority to sign the agreement. Using the SANRAL example, the 
board of directors of SANRAL are imbued with the power to enter into agreements130 but may 
delegate this power to the CEO131 and allow the CEO to further sub-delegate these powers to 
employees of SANRAL132. Agreements of this nature could therefore be signed by an 
employee of SANRAL delegated to do so where delegations were provided in terms of the 
preceding sections of the SANRAL Act. Similarly, the authority of the ‘municipality’ to sign 
the agreement would lie with the Municipal Manager in terms of section 55 of the Local 
Government: Municipal Systems Act133 and not the authorised official or chairperson of an 
MPT as envisaged in SPLUMA. The reason for this is that the agreement is not a planning 
authorisation. It may become the case, however, that a Municipal Manager sub-delegates the 
authority to sign a section 29 agreement in terms of section 59 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
The logical choice for such a sub-delegation would be to the Head of Planning within a given 
municipality. 
A concern to note is that the entering of the agreement by a municipality is discretionary. 
Section 29(2) states that ‘a municipality may enter into an agreement with an organ of state.’ 
This obviously has major implications on the certainty of success when proceeding down this 
avenue as a municipality could legally refuse to enter into such an agreement. The municipality 
could insist that the organ of state apply for the planning authorisations in the ordinary course 
as would any ordinary developer in terms of the municipality’s bylaws. As a consequence, the 
issues giving rise to the necessity of an agreement would not be solved. It is argued that in 
these circumstances political intervention may be required in order to realise the prescripts of 
co-operative governance as laid out in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. Furthermore, the refusal 
by a municipality to enter into an agreement when approached by an organ of state 
implementing state infrastructure may, in and of itself, be enough to trigger the provisions of 
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sections 41 to 44 of the IRFA. An organ of state could declare a formal dispute with the 
municipality on the basis that the actions or inactions of the municipality in entering an 
agreement hamper the implementation of national policy and legislation and therefore fall foul 
of the principles in the Constitution, SPLUMA and the IRFA. 
Section 29(3) states: 
‘After a Municipality has concluded an agreement contemplated in subsection (2), the relevant 
Municipal Planning Tribunal may take account of any process authorised under the legislation 
covered by that agreement as adequate for meeting the requirements of [SPLUMA]’.  
The requirements referred to above are captured in section 42(1) and 42(2) of SPLUMA. This 
section sets out the considerations by an MPT or authorised official in deciding an application. 
These considerations consist, inter alia, of public interest134, transformation imperatives135, 
relevant facts and circumstances136, rights and obligations of affected parties137, impact on 
engineering services138, timeframes139, and environmental legislation140. As discussed, the 
content of the agreement would therefore have to include provision for the above factors in 
order to satisfy an MPT taking account of the agreement that the requirements of SPLUMA 
have been met. Only after these factors have been considered by an MPT could they issue 
planning authorisations flowing from the agreement. 
As mentioned previously, an MPT faced with a section 29(2) agreement still ‘has to make its 
own decision, according to its own enabling legislation and the criteria set out in the enabling 
legislation’141, in this case SPLUMA. It has been argued that section 29(3) seemingly averts 
this principle, raising the risk that decisions taken by an MPT taking account of an agreement 
will be susceptible to an appeal and, thereafter, administrative review. In order to avoid a 
situation where an MPT essentially abdicates its duties in terms of SPLUMA, ‘the MPT must 
consider an application by applying its collective mind to each of the requirements of 
SPLUMA, irrespective of whether another organ of state has already considered the same issue 
in terms of its enabling legislation’142. The content of the agreement is fundamental to 
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achieving this. The agreement is not merely a statement that the organ of state, in terms of its 
enabling legislation, has considered the issues and therefore an MPT must as a result ‘rubber 
stamp’ their planning authorisations. The agreement, as discussed, should contain sufficient 
detail upon which an MPT can consider all the requirements referred to earlier. The agreement 
provides the framework for the processes to be followed and a vehicle for the information to 
be considered. This will avoid a potential review in terms of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act143 (PAJA). The grounds of review are found in section 6(2) of PAJA and an 
applicant must argue his case on review in terms of one or more of these grounds.144 Were an 
MPT to take a decision without taking into account the content of the agreement, they could be 
accused of a ‘failure to apply the mind’.145 This failure to apply the mind, ‘can be a reference 
to either a more specific ground of review (such as a failure to take account of all relevant 
considerations or misconstruing the facts and the law) or an umbrella phrase referring to all the 
grounds of review’.146 Thus in circumstances where an agreement did not contain sufficient 
detail, or where an MPT did not scrutinise this detail, a decision taken by an MPT on the back 
of the section 29(2) agreement would be reviewable in terms of section 6(2)(e)(iii) and (vi), 
(f)(ii) and (h) of PAJA after the SPLUMA appeal process had been exhausted. 
SPLUMA is framework legislation providing for, among many other things, the framework for 
the implementation of municipal planning bylaws. Similarly, it provides the framework for the 
agreement between organs of state.147 Thus, it is not necessary that municipal planning bylaws 
cater for the agreement. The agreement falls outside the provisions and ambit of bylaws and 
can therefore be dealt with directly in terms of SPLUMA as the enabling legislation. 
A question which may arise when the agreement is being considered by an MPT for the issuing 
of planning approvals, is the authority on which an organ of state is able to make planning 
applications for properties of which the organ is not necessarily the owner. Section 45 of 
SPLUMA categorises the parties to a development application. It stipulates who may submit a 
land development application. These include the owner of the land concerned148 and a person 
duly authorised as an agent of the owner.149 This would in most circumstances require a Power 
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of Attorney (PoA) from the owner of the land. However, section 45 also lists ‘a service provider 
responsible for the provision of infrastructure, utilities or other related services’150 as one of 
the parties who can submit a land development application. A service provider includes a 
person or institution that performs a function which affects the use, form or function of land.151 
Following the SANRAL example, SANRAL is clearly an institution which, by the 
implementation of national roads, affects the use, form and function of land. Furthermore, 
SANRAL is responsible for infrastructure. Thus, SANRAL and other similar organs of state 
implementing infrastructure can rely on these sections in order to avoid the onerous task of 
arranging PoAs from all affected owners or having to acquire or expropriate these properties 
before an agreement makes its way before an MPT in terms of section 29(3). 
Finally, it important to explore the extremely beneficial role which norms and standards can 
play in realising the potential of an agreement in terms of section 29(2). Section 8(1) of 
SPLUMA provides that the Minister must, after consultation with organs of state…prescribe 
norms and standards for land use management and land development that are consistent with 
SPLUMA, IRFA and PAJA.152 Norms are based on what is common practice, local knowledge 
and acceptable behaviour while standards deal with minimum sectoral and technical 
considerations.153 The norms and standards must reflect the national policy, national policy 
priorities and programmes relating to land use management and land development.154 They 
must also ensure that land development applications, procedures and timeframes are efficient 
and effective.155 Using the SANRAL example, national road infrastructure and specific projects 
would be considered as part of national policy and certain routes would be considered as 
national priorities. In these instances, the Minister, at the request of another Minister (in the 
ongoing SANRAL example, the ‘other Minister’ would be the Minister of Transport) could 
prescribe norms and standards to guide the related sectoral land development or land use.156 
The sectoral land development and land use in the on-going SANRAL example, would include 
norms and standards binding municipalities on the way they consider all land development 
relating to national roads and areas on which a national road is declared. The norms and 
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standards could also standardise the preliminary consultation phase prior to the signing of the 
agreement in order to reduce vastly differing approaches to the consultation being taken by 
different municipalities. Finally, norms and standards would give credence to the section 29 
approach and would go a long way in comforting municipalities that a section 29 agreement 
was a viable way in which to deal with these hybrid land development applications. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Using SANRAL as an example, it is plain to see that the interaction, interrelation and overlap 
between the three spheres of government, insofar as it relates to planning generally, is complex 
and fraught with nuances, which needs to be unpacked. Unpacking the complexities and 
nuances is fundamental to ensuring that the planning of state infrastructure is undertaken in a 
constitutionally acceptable manner which does not impede on the implementation of state 
infrastructure which will ultimately be detrimental to service delivery. 
Cases such as Wary Holdings, Gauteng Development Tribunal, Maccsand and Telkom among 
others, illustrate the importance placed on the concept of ‘municipal planning’. The precedent 
has shown the increasing ambit of ‘municipal planning’ and consequently the increasing 
executive and administrative powers of municipalities relating to this. As discussed, this 
increasing planning power of municipalities has restricted the previously acceptable actions of 
organs of state relating to the planning for state infrastructure. The case law, however, 
universally stresses the importance of the constitutional concept of co-operative government in 
dealing with such overlaps and conflicts. 
SPLUMA was a necessary and welcome piece of planning legislation which sought to 
consolidate the previous fragmented system of planning law in South Africa by providing a 
framework which was simple and constitutionally acceptable. Unintended consequences of 
SPLUMA, some of which have been explored in this paper, have meant that issues such as the 
planning of State of Infrastructure have become more complex as a result. As has been shown, 
sections 52 and 55 of SPLUMA, which may have been intended to provide the answer to this 
conundrum. The provisions are partly unworkable due to the unconstitutionality of the 
provisions therein, or generally ineffective at expediting applications due to the introduction of 
a further level of bureaucracy. If Sections 52 and 55 are relied on, it will, in all likelihood, lead 
to further delays rather than expediting state infrastructure planning. 
It has been argued and shown how an agreement in terms of section 29 of SPLUMA is the best-
fitted provision in SPLUMA to address the difficulties inherent in state infrastructure planning 
and implementation. Consultation (negotiation) and the resultant agreement in terms of section 
29 realises and promotes the constitutional imperative of co-operative government. Having the 
parties negotiate an agreement around a table during the infancy of a state infrastructure project 
to align their respective planning competencies and vision will surely avoid the situation that 
arose in both Maccsand and Telkom. Furthermore, such an agreement can be utilised swiftly 
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and effectively to formalise existing state infrastructure planning where necessary, as was 
shown in the case of SANRAL’s historical road network. 
A section 29 agreement is not without its own pitfalls and difficulties as has been shown. It is 
imperative that the content of the section 29 agreement includes sufficient detail and is drafted 
in such a way to ensure that the parties are not seen to be delegating their constitutional decision 
making functions to one another. An MPT considering such an agreement should apply its 
mind to the considerations enunciated in section 42 of SPLUMA before approving an 
application based on such an agreement. Failure to do the aforementioned may result in a 
review in terms of PAJA once the SPLUMA appeal process has been exhausted. If the MPT 
did not sufficiently apply its mind to the agreement, or if the agreement was drafted in such a 
way as to derogate a party’s constitutional decision-making authority, then the eventual 
decision may be set aside on review or appeal. 
The section 29 agreement is a fresh approach to solving the problems inherent in state 
infrastructure planning. This freshness and being ‘out of the ordinary’ could well be detrimental 
factors to its practical acceptance. In terms of section 29, a municipality has the discretion to 
enter into such an agreement and therefore the fact that this approach is out of the ordinary may 
well work against the adoption of the agreement. It is possible that a municipality faced with a 
process outside of the ambit of their bylaws and on which they have received no provincial or 
national guidance, will be unwilling to exercise its discretion to enter into such an agreement. 
Thus, it is imperative that norms and standards are prescribed in terms of section 8 of SPLUMA 
to ensure that the process of consultation and form of the agreement are uniform and will 
provide some degree of comfort to a municipality exercising its discretion. 
Planning law is evolving at a rapid rate. The ever increasing population of South Africa also 
dictates that the implementation of state infrastructure must happen at a rapid rate. It is therefore 
vital that the planning and implementation of state infrastructure moves in tandem with the 
changing approach to planning in South Africa. If it does not, then the ultimate price will be 
paid by society as a whole where the practical implementation of state infrastructure, necessary 
for the smooth functioning of society, is impeded by bureaucracy. A section 29 agreement, if 
embraced, is one potential way in which this situation can be avoided. 
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